Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal
Volume 14 | Issue 1

Article 8

1996

Pandora's (E-Mail) Box: E-Mail Monitoring in the
Workplace
John Araneo

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Araneo, John (1996) "Pandora's (E-Mail) Box: E-Mail Monitoring in the Workplace," Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal: Vol.
14: Iss. 1, Article 8.
Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol14/iss1/8

This document is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Labor
and Employment Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact
lawcls@hofstra.edu.

Araneo: Pandora's (E-Mail) Box: E-Mail Monitoring in the Workplace

PANDORA'S (E-MAIL) BOX: E-MAIL
MONITORING IN THE WORKPLACE
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the battle between employer monitoring and the employee's

privacy .rights, the most recent, although inadvertent weapon in the
employer's arsenal is the use of e-mail. The rapid proliferation' of email in the workplace facilitates the employer's ability to monitor their

employees2 and has brought about unanticipated dilemmas.3 These

problems have yet to be addressed with any consistency by the courts to

form a foundational body of cogent precedent.4 The federal wiretap

statute,' which apparently addresses this problem, was not drafted for the
omnipotent and technologically advanced nature of e-mail. The statute's

continued application has revealed both its inability to address e-mail
issues squarely and the resulting loopholes.6
Today, the issues of e-mail privacy and e-mail monitoring linger in
a legal vacuum.7 Many employers are taking advantage of this situation

and are using e-mail monitoring as a technological bullystick over their
employees.8 Unfortunately, as the law stands, there is nothing to prevent

them from doing so. However, employers who choose to monitor their
employees e-mail do so at their own risk,9 at least until the law can
catch up with technology. This Note addresses the new problems in the

1. See James J. Cappel, Closing the E-Mail Privacy Gap, 44 J. SYs. MGMT. 6 (1993).
2. See BonnieBrown, Is E-MailPrivateor Public?,COMPuTERWORLD, June 27, 1994, at 135.
3. See Terry Loscalzo, ProtectingYour Company From E-Mail Litigation, PENN. L. WKLY.,
Feb. 12, 1996, at 7.
4. See id.at 7; see also Robert Barker, E-Mail Issues, INTERNAL AUDITOR, Aug. 1995, at 60,
62.
5. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2711 (1994).
6. See Gene Barton, Taking a Byte Out of Crime:E-Mail Harassmentand the Inefficacy of
Existing Lmv, 70 WASH. L. REV. 465 (1995).
7. See Donald H. Seifinan & Craig W. Trepanier, Evolution of the Paperless Ofice: Legal
Issues Arising Out of Technology in the Worlplace, 21 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 3, 14 (1995).
8. See Lauren Coleman-Lochner, Candid Camera:Many Companies Spy on Their Workers,
BERGEN REC., Jan. 9, 1995, at C4.
9. See Teresa A. Daniel, Electronic and Voice Mail Monitoring of Employees: A Practical
Approach, 22 EMPLOYMENT REL. TODAY 1, 2 (1995) (cautioning that there are no hard and fast rules
on employer e-mail monitoring and the employee's reciprocal privacy rights).
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workplace brought about by e-mail communication, and analyzes the
deficient state of the law with regard to e-mail privacy for employees.
Then a new analytical approach is suggested for devising a remedial
strategy to create harmony between the employer who chooses to monitor
its employees' e-mail and his employees. Finally, a solution is posed to
the more immediate problem of employer e-mail monitoring as the law
stands today.
A.

E-Mail in Today ' Society

As our society further constructs the new information super0
highway, we are coming closer to a digital and paperless society." The
Federal Communications Commission Chairman, Reed Hunt, has
appropriately labeled this social metamorphosis as a "communications
revolution."'1 The next generation, eager to surf cyberspace and share
information via the world-wide web will be intimately familiar, if not
dependent, on the most effective way to engage in this sharing; electronic
mail. Today is merely a transitional stage, as the use of e-mail still
12
edge of technology.
connotes a perception of being on the cutting
However, this perception will not linger in the masses for much longer.
Soon the excitement in "pointing and clicking" your e-mail box will
evolve into a commonplace act such as that of opening letters and
dredging through junk mail.
The increasing popularity of e-mail is most pronounced in the
workplace. It's efficient, quick, and the perfect tool to both eliminate
phone-tag"3 and receive and disseminate information throughout a large
workforce. For larger companies there are savings to be reaped in paper
and postage costs. 14 E-mail facilitates the "free exchange of messages
in a manner similar to talking on the telephone and writing a letter, but
with advantages over both, combining the telephone's immediacy with

10. See Seifinan & Trepanier, supra note 7, at 5.
11. Ilene Knable Gotts & Alan D. Rutenberg, Navigating the Global Information Superhighway: A Bumpy Road Lies Ahead, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 275 (1995).
12. See Paul Frisman, E-Mail: Dial 'E'for 'Evidence', CONN. L. TRIB., Dec. 18, 1995, at I
(praising e-mail as a seductive, high tech and magical means of communication); see also Arnie M.
Soden, Protect Your CorporationFrom E-Mail Litigation;Privacy, Copyright Issues Should be
a
Addressed in Policy, CoRp. LEGAL TIMEs, May 1995, at 19 (labeling e-mail as part of
communication).
in
explosion
technological
13. See James J. Cappel, Closing the E-Mail Privacy Gap, 44 J. SYS. MGMT. 6 (1993).

14. See id.
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a letter's thoroughness."' 5 Computer law specialist Charles R. Merril
points out that e-mail is so useful because it is independent of geography
and time. 16 The bottom line is that e-mail is the preferred choice of
communication mediums in corporate America.
The penetration rate of e-mail in Fortune 500 companies of 67
17
percent in 1990 jumped at hyper-speed to 98 percent in only one year.
A survey taken by the Electronic Mail Association's Research and
Statistics Committee projected that the number of e-mail users in Fortune
2000 companies would increase from the 1992 number of 8.9 million to
an astounding 15.6 million in just the following year. 8 Recent figures
also indicate that 90 percent of all companies with 100 employees or
more use e-mail.' 9 Overall, nearly 60 million Americans use some form
of e-mail to conduct business on a daily basis sending approximately two
billion messages every month.2" The Electronic Association's 1995
Market Research Study Preliminary Report projects the monetary value
of the "e-mail market" to reach 61.3 billion dollars by the year 2000.21
B. E-Mail Anatomy 101
This Note uses two different models in discussing an "e-mail
system." It should be noted that systems in the real world may not fit
directly into just one of the two categories. Many systems are in fact
22
hybrids or mutations of these two general systems.
The first category, and probably the broadest, is where the employee
uses e-mail through a public service, such as America Online, Prodigy
or CompuServe. In this environment, the user will transmit a message via

15. See Gene Barton, Taking a Byte Out of Crime: E-Mail Harassmentand the Inefficacy of
ExistingLaw, 70 WASH. L. REv. 465, 466-67 (1995).
16. See Frisman, supra note 12, at 1 (quoting Charles R. Merril).
17. See Cappel, supra note 13, at 6.
18. See Cappel, supra note 13, at 6.
19. See Arnie M. Soden, ProtectYour CorporationFromE-Mail Litigation:Privacy,Copyright
Issues Should be Addressed in Policy, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, May 1995, at 19.
20. See Andrew Jacobs, Cranking Up the E-Mail Business, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., May 21,
1995, at I1.
21. See ELECrRONIC MAIL ASSOCIATION, 1995 MARKET RESEARCH STUDY (preliminary report).
22. See Donald H. Seifian & Craig W. Trepanier, Evolution of the Paperless Office: Legal
Issues Arising Out of Technology in the Workplace, 21 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 3 at 10 (discussing both
the public and the fully private internal models of an e-mail system); see also Randolph S. Sergent,
A ForthAmendment Model For ComputerNetworks and DataPrivacy, 81 VA. L. REV. 1181, 1183-

84 (1995).
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phone lines that are owned by the public provider.2 3 Most often in this
situation, the employer acts as a liaison between the employee and the
commercial service by paying for the service. 24 This role of "provider,"
25
becomes significant under the controlling federal statute. The second
category is where the employer owns and maintains an internal system
of e-mail communication. It is this situation where the law is most
convoluted.26 It is also important to note that it is common practice in
27
both scenarios to automatically create back up files of all data. This
is a normal procedure, usually conducted by a system administrator done
28
for convenience, security and overall maintenance of the system.
C. Emergence of an UnanticipatedProblem
Today's new and exciting technology however, spawns new and
exciting problems. E-mail privacy is evolving as one of the most
frustrating and perplexing legal issues of the electronic-information era,
"representing a burgeoning and unsettled area of the law."29 In the
corporate legal community, it has been labeled as a "potential hothouse"
for employment related litigation issues.3" As a result, the legal community is encountering more and more client questions about e-mail
privacy." The prudent attorney needs to become familiar with these
issues, and shed the common perception that these are strictly intellectual
property issues.32 Both the employer and the employee have legitimate
concerns and formidable arguments.

23. See S. REP. No. 99-541 at 5, 8 (1986) (urging the amendment of the current federal wiretap
law as to amend so as to include e-mail as a form of protected communication; see also discussion
infra Part I.D.
24. See generally Lois R. Witt, TerminallyNosy: Are Employers Freeto Access Our Electronic
Mail?, 96 DICK. L. REv. 545, 548-53 (1992) (discussing the various models of e-mail systems).
25. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2711 (1994); see also discussion infra Part I.D.2. (discussing the
various exceptions of the ECPA).

26. See Who Owns Your E-Mail Message?, 10 LAN TIMES, Nov. 15, 1993, at 86.

27. See Tim Cahoon, Playing Peek-a-boo With E-Mail; Workplace PrivacyIssues, HP PROF.,

Mar. 1994, at 56.
28. See id.
29. Jeanne W. Harvey, Set Your Rules on E-Mail, NATIONS Bus., Aug. 1995, at 48.
30. Amie M. Soden, Protect Your Corporation From E-Mail Litigation: Privacy, Copyright
Issues Should be Addressed in Policy, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, May 1985, at 19.
31. See Abdon M. Pallasch, Company Policies to Monitor E-Mail Licking Edge of Electronic
Envelope, CHI. LAW., Aug. 1995, at 4.
32. See Margaret C. Phillips, The Challenge ofDefining "Acceptable Use, " LEGAL TIMES, Jan.
22, 1996, at 838.
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Employers naturally want to know to what extent they can legally
monitor their employee's e-mail messages. As a cost of doing business,
the employer needs to be able to identify and remedy any unauthorized
or excessive use. Although the cost-per-message is minuscule, it becomes
substantial in the context of a company like E.I. du Pont, with it's 90,000
employees.33 Furthermore, the employer needs to protect confidential
and privileged information, such as trade secrets.3 For example, it has
been speculated that if trademarked information is inadvertently passed
through an e-mail system, it may lose it's protection."
Similarly, information that is protected by the attorney-client
relationship may lose its shield if it cannot survive judicial scrutiny in
determining exactly who had access to the information on the e-mail
system.36 Unfortunately, there is always the risk of losing sensitive
information to "hackers"3 7 or other unauthorized users on the
Internet.38 Copyright infringement, which is all too common on the
Internet,39 is usually tolerated by subscribers and "surfers" alike, but
when the employee of a company with deep pockets is involved, the
4°
viability of a lawsuit becomes more attractive to potential plaintiffs.
Employer liability for their workers who slander or defame others is also
a concern. 4 ' Finally, an e-mail system can facilitate many forms of
employee theft.42
Employer's also face a magnified exposure to liability in the form
of sexual harassment when an e-mail system is incorporated into the mix.
The employer, who can be liable even without actual knowledge of the

33. See Robert Barker, E-Mail Issues, INTERNAL AUDITOR, Aug. 1995, at 60.

34. See Donald H. Seifinan & Craig W. Trepanier, Evolution of the Paperless Office: Legal
Issues Arising Out of Technology in the Workplace, 21 EMPLOYEE REL. LJ.3, 21 (1995).

35. See id. at 22 (supporting the premise that since an individual will lose trademark protection
if she does not take reasonable efforts to maintain confidentiality, the information being on the
system is indicative of the failure to take these reasonable efforts).
36. See Teresa A. Daniel, Electronic and Voice Mail Monitoring of Employees: A Practical
Approach, 22 EMPLOYMENT REL. TODAY 2, 3 (1995).
37. Randolph S. Sergent, A Forth Amendment Model For Computer Networks and Data
Privacy, 81 VA. L. REV. 1181, 1182 n.1 (1995).
38. Amie M. Soden, Protect Your CorporationFrom E-Mail Litigation: Privacy, Copyright
Issues Should be Addressed in Policy, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, May 1995, at 20.
39. See Donald H. Seifinan & Craig W. Trepanier, Evolution of the Paperless Office: Legal
Issues Arising Out of Technology in the Workplace, 21 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 3, 22 (1995).

40. See id.
41. See id. at 17-18.
42. See iL at 21-22 (noting the risk employers face with regards to it's employees
misappropriating confidential and proprietary information).
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harassment,4 is further imperiled by e-mail because sexual harassment
may be occurring between employees, and even the most cautious
manager or supervisor will be ignorant thereof. In the absence of e-mail,
the manager or other workers may notice the offending behavior, or at
the very least, be aware that the two employees are interacting. However,
with e-mail at their disposal, harassers may be sending sexually offensive
or "flaming"44 messages in stealth. The second problem is that when the
harassment does eventually come out, the victim may in fact be equipped
with a virtual transcript of the conduct, because unlike personal
communications, there will almost always be a record of e-mail
4
messages. Thus, the potential for damaging evidence is amplified. "
Furthermore, use of a bulletin board on a public or private network
can be used to impregnate the workplace with a form of sexual
' 6
harassment known as a "hostile work environment."' E-mail communications are conducive to the creation of a sexually hostile work
environment because unlike human interaction, with e-mail communication, colloquial messages are often sent back and forth without the ability
to adjust it's impact. For example, a message may be put on the system
and any intended or unintended reader may be offended by it. This same
message that is permanently inscribed for the reader, might well have
been cut off in conversation due to the speaker's perception of the
47
listener's reaction. In short, e-mail allows no impact adjustment, and
thereby only increases the chances for the development of a sexually
hostile work environment.
These potential problems have already begun to play out in the
courtroom. For example, in a 1993 case of sexual discrimination
involving Microsoft,48 the court allowed sexually suggestive e-mail
messages that revealed sex-based discrimination to be admitted as
evidence at trial.49 Although still pending in the courts, Microsoft's

43. See generally Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (holding that an
employer need not have actual knowledge of the harassment to be held liable).
44. Gene Barton, Taking a Byte Out of Crime: E-Mail Harassment and the IneI'cacy of
Existing Law, 70 WASH. L. REv. 465, 467-68 (1995).
45. See Seifman & Trapanier, supra note 39, at 20.
46. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66.
47. See Seifnan & Trapanier, supranote 39, at 19-20 (discussing the anonymous nature ofe-

mail).
48. See Strauss v. Microsoft Corp., 814 F.Supp. 1186 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
49. See id. at 1194.
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recent motion in limine to exclude admission of the e-mail messages into
evidence was denied."
Other forms of general liability are also a concern, because e-mail
is a virtual goldmine of information for discovery purposes in litigation." Since 1970, Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has
been amended to accommodate the discovery of electronic communications." Because of the perception that e-mail, which magically disappears at the touch of a button, has a less corporeal quality than written
memorandums, often employees will transmit extremely sensitive, if not
potentially incriminating information. This "out of sight, out of mind"
perception of many employees can be extremely damaging to companies
being sued and incredibly valuable to those bringing suit. Today there are
actually new companies who specialize in the service of seeking
computer evidence for use in litigation. 3
The discoverability of e-mail can also be extremely expensive for
an employer who is ordered to produce it for litigation. The courts may
push the employer to provide extensive amounts of e-mail for evidence
purposes, even at costs exceeding thousands of dollars. 4 In any event,
since the probability of having to disclose e-mail communications in
litigation is very likely, and considering the potential degree of harm it
can cause, plus the significant monetary costs, this is a legitimate concern
for any employer.
Another area of concern for the employer is the threat of unionization via e-mail systems. Frank C. Morris, a partner at Epstein, Becker &
Green, in Washington D.C. uses the metaphor of "a real sleeping
giant' 55 to indicate how the problem of union solicitation via e-mail
may soon be the topic of some interesting legal debate. The evolving

50. See Strauss v. Microsoft Corp., No. 91 Civ. 5928, 1995 WL 326492, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June
1,1995).
51. See Paul Frisman, E-Mail: Dial "E'for'Evidence," CONN. L. TRIB., Dec. 18, 1995, at 1.
52. See FED.R. Civ. P. 34.; see also Greg Davis & Robert M. Baker, The Legal Implications
of Electronic Document Retention, BUS. HORIZONS, May 1995, at 51.
53. See Heidi L. McNeil & Robert M. Kort, Discovery of E-Mail and Other Computerized
Information, 31 ARiz. ATT'Y, Apr. 1995, at 16, 18.
54. See, e.g, In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation, No. 94 C 897, MDL
997, 1995 WL 360526, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995) (holding that the employer must pay the approximately sixty thousand dollar cost of producing the e-mail evidence requested by the classplaintiffs). But see Bass Public Limited Co. v. Promus Companies, No. 92 Civ. 0969 (SWK), 1994
WL 702052, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1991) (declining to order the employer to produce e-mail
communications for a staff of 100 employees in favor of requiring the same for a smaller set often
employees).
55. Arnie M. Soden, Protect Your CorporationFrom E-Mail Litigation:Privacy, Copyright
Issues Should be Addressed in Policy, Cop. LEGAL TIMES, May 1995, at 20.
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status of "no solicitation rules" in the workplace has been less than
consistent," and arguably, the rules developed under the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA") by the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB") could not have been articulated with the forethought of such
a potent communication medium as e-mail. Employers now must deal
with the threat of union infiltration or solicitation through their own email systems."
The limited precedent involving e-mail and union solicitation
indicates that traditional rules of discriminatory union treatment to work
regulations will apply." Suffice it to say here that companies with valid
no solicitation rules will indeed be subject to electronic communications
in contravention to these rules. Unfortunately, they may be forced to test
the legalities of this issue for the rest of the world.
Employee's concerns are quantifiably minimal in comparison, but
qualitatively, they arouse some visceral fundamental rights. 9 Employees
that use e-mail are becoming more and more dependent on it as a means
of communication." In turn, there is an inherent desire and need for
privacy over one's e-mail messages, as there is with personal phone calls
or an employee's desk. Employer monitoring presents a vast array of
issues with respect to the rights, needs and desires of employees, 61 but
what is most pertinent here is the issue of the employee's reasonable
expectations of privacy.

56. See generally PATRICK HARDIN, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW (3d ed. 1992).
57. See Donald H. Seifman & Craig W. Trepanier, Evolution of the PaperlessOffice: Legal
Issues Arising Out of Technology in the Workplace, 21 EMPLOYEE REL. LJ.3 at 23 (1995).
58. See E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 311 NLRB 893 (1993) (holding that the employer
violated § 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by prohibiting the union to use the e-mail system which had been
used in the past for non-work purposes).
59. See generally Randolph S. Sergent, A Forth Amendment Model For Computer Networks
and Data Privacy, 81 VA. L. REV. 1181 (giving a detailed analysis on the privacy rights that are
most often challenged by computer networks).
60. See discussion supra Part I.B.
61. See, e.g., IRA MiCHAEL SHEPARD ET AL., WORKPLACE PRIVACY: EMPLOYEE TESTING,
SURVEILLANCE, WRONGFUL DISCHARGE, AND OTHER AREAS OF VULNERABILITY 205-19 (2d ed.

1989).
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D. CurrentLegislation
1. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
"There's no law that says your boss can't read your e-mail or tap
your phone." 62
The federal statute that addresses the legality of intercepting and
monitoring e-mail communications is the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986 ("ECPA"). 6' This statute amended Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,' also known
more casually as the "Federal Wiretapping Statute,"6" to include
electronic communications. 66 The ECPA's purpose was to update the
current federal statute to account for new technology and electronic
mediums.6 7 As one commentator put it:
In 1986 the United States Congress extensively amended the federal
wiretap law in order to bring most electronic communications within
it's protective cloak. The new legislation expressly targeted electronic
mail (e-mail), as well as other common forms of non-aural electronic
data communications. The law, as amended protects e-mail messages
from interception by and disclosure to third parties ....The law
contains several major exemptions, however, some of which should
prove important ....Employers who choose to take advantage of the
should take precautions to ensure that the law
exceptions to prohibition
68
protects their conduct.
The ECPA has many detailed sections and has received mixed
reviews from commentators. The Federal Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit has commented that "understanding the Act requires understand-

62. Lauren Coleman-Lochner, Candid Camera: Many Companies Spy on Their Workers,
BERGEN REc., Jan. 9, 1995, at C4 (quoting Lewis Maltby, Director of Workplace Division, American

Civil Liberties Union).
63. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2711 (1994).
64. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1982).
65. Steve Jackson Games, Inc., v. United States Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457, 460 (5th Cir.
1994).
66. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (1994).
67. See Julia T. Baumhart, The Employer's Right to Read Employee E-Mail: Protecting
Propertyor PersonalPrying?, 8 LAB. LAW. 923 (1992).
68. Id.
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ing and applying its many technical terms as defined by the Act, as well
as engaging in painstaking, methodical analysis. '69 Additionally, the
Court stated that the act was "famous (if not infamous) for its lack of
clarity."7 Nonetheless, the ECPA has been noted for its ability to
prohibit computer eavesdropping,7 1 and as legislation that affirmatively
intended to close loopholes in the statute which were created by
advancing technology.72 Yet there has been some criticism on how well
the act adapts itself to new technology.73 The concern is that merely rewording a statute originally drafted for telephone eavesdropping cannot
be adapted to confront the new and unique quandaries created by
technology.7 4
The ECPA prohibits interception, use and disclosure of electronic
communications.7 The statute expressly allows victims of interceptions
to bring a civil action.7 6 The statute will grant actual damages as well
as punitive damages of any profits made by the violator as a result of the
violation, and statutory damages of whichever is greater of 100 dollars
77
a day for each day of the violation, or a sum of 10,000 dollars. The
ECPA also allows for equitable relief,7 including declaratory judgments79 and the granting of attorney and legal fees. 0 Finally, the
ECPA may also impose criminal penalties.8 '
The wiretapping statute, prior to the ECPA amendment, only
82
Not all
protected interceptions of "wire and aural communications.
electronic communications are aural (heard by the human ear). Those that
are not aural, by definition, were not protected. The ECPA merely added

69. Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 461.
70. Id. at 462
71. See Tim Cahoon, Playing Peek-a-boo With E-Mail; Workplace Privacy Issues, HP PROF.,

Mar. 1994, at 56.
72. See Brian D. Pedrow & Debra E. Kohn, Tampering With E-Mail: ProprietaryRights and
Privacy Issues, L. PRAC. MGMT., Nov.Dec., 1995, at 36, 37.
73. See Ilene Knable Gotts & Alan D. Rutenberg, Navigating the Global Information
Superhighway: A Bumpy Road Lies Ahead, 8 HARv. L. & TECH. 275 (1995).

74. See id.
75. See 18 U.S.C. §2511 (1994).
76. See id. § 2520(a).
77. See id. § 2520(2)(A)(B).

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See id. § 2707(b).
See id. § 2707(b)(1).
See id. § 2707(b)(3).
See id. § 2701(b).
18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1968). The statutory definition of "intercept," at that time included

only the aural acquisition of the contents of wire or oral communications through the use of a
device. Id.
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the words "or other," to the definition of intercept. 3 In addition,
assuming this semantic augmentation was not enough, the ECPA also
84
interjected within the statute the term "electronic communication,"
complete with its own definition. 5
In short, the most significant changes in the statute boil down to the
interpolation of a few words which render the relevant statutory language
to read "the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire,
electronic or oral communication." 6 Obviously, these words have
proved to be less than the ideal solution to the problems brought by new
technological communication mediums. 7
2.

i.

Exceptions and Exemptions

Provider/Business Use Exception

In protecting against "interception," the ECPA includes an express
provision that results in a latent exception. Pursuant to the statutory
language, interception requires the use of any "electronic... device.""8
However, in defining "device,"8 9 the statute exempts any device that is
furnished to the user by the "provider of the wire or electronic communication service, in the ordinary course of its business ....90 As a
result, if the courts will construe an employer as a "provider," then it
seems that the employer may indeed have a blanket license to intercept
any communication that is related to business use.
The exception is reiterated later in the statute by providing that it
shall not be unlawful for -an "operator of a switchboard, or an officer,
employee or agent of a provider ...to intercept ...that communication
in the normal course of his employment while engaged in any activity

83. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1986).
84. Id. § 2510(12).
85. Id. "Electronic Communication" is defined as "any transfer of signs, signals, writing,
images, sounds, data or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio,
electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce,
but does not include-(A) any wire or oral communication (B) any communication made through a
tone-only paging device; or (C) any communication from a tracking device. Id.
86. Id. § 2510(4).
87. See Paul Frisman, E-Mail: Dial 'E'for 'Evidence,' CONN. L. TRIB., Dec. 18, 1995, at 5
(commenting that ECPA provides more protection for phone calls then for e-mail).

88. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1994).
89. Id. § 2510(5).
90. Id. § 2510(5)(a)(i).
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which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his service ....
Labeled as the "provider" 92 or the "business use exception,"' ' these
two exceptions may indeed be the statutory loopholes for those
employers who choose to monitor their employee's e-mail.
The business use exception has been subject to judicial interpretation, but predominately in the context of intercepting phone calls, not email transmissions." However, because of the similarities between the
two mediums, the courts' interpretations and applications are a good
indicator of how it would be applied to e-mail. 95 Briefly, for this
exception to apply, it seems that the business purpose must be one that
is credible,9 6 and the monitoring or intercepting cannot be excessive. 97
The exception will also extend to situations where the employer can
prove he is preventing the corrosion of the work environment by
misconduct9 8 or that he has a justified suspicion regarding an employee's disclosure of confidential information."
With the current state of the law and the way the statutory language
is drafted, it seems there is a loophole well within the employer's grasp.
If the employer requires that all e-mail is to be used for business
purposes only, this will preserve the protection of the business use
exception, because all transmissions on the system will either be business
related or in violation of the e-mail policy, which in either case gives the
employer the right to read them.
ii.

Consent

Another caveat lies in the area of consent. The ECPA allows
interception of communications where there is some form of consent."'
Specifically, the statute allows interception where "such person is a party
to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has

91. Id. § 2511(2)(a)(i).
92. Pedrow & Kohn, supra note 72, at 37.
93. Thomas R. Greenberg, E-Mail and Voice Mail:Employee Privacyand the FederalWiretap
Statute, 44 AM. U. L. REv., 219, 239-41 (1994).
94. See, e.g., Sanders v. Robert Bosch Corp., 38 F.3d 736 (4th Cir. 1994).
95. See Pedrow & Kohn, supra note 72, at 37.
96. See Sanders, 38 F.3d at 741.
97. See id. But see Epps v. St. Mary's Hosp. of Athen's Inc., 802 F.2d 412 (11th Cir. 1986)
(applying the business use exception to a situation where the employer overheard and recorded a
phone conversation containing disparaging remarks between two co-workers).
98. See Epps, 802 F.2d at 417.
99. See Briggs v. American Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414, 420 (5th Cir. 1980).
100. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (1994).
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given prior consent to such interception."'' The consent can be express
or implied0 2 and it has been held that "consent inheres where a
person's behavior manifests acquiescence or a comparable voluntary
diminution of his or her otherwise protected rights."'0 3 Furthermore,
there may in fact be implied consent by the employees under many
circumstances." ° For example, employees who use the e-mail system
after the employer has announced a clear policy of monitoring the system
may have in fact given "implied consent' to the monitoring. 0 5 However, recent case law indicates that mere knowledge of an employer's
capability to monitor does not alone equal implied consent, 06 and an
employer's warning alone, without actual proof of notice to the employee
that she is in fact being monitored, may not be enough to establish
implied consent. 7
In short, the resulting loophole is actualized merely by implementing
creative ways to establish implied consent as per the court precedent. The
guileful employer could simply program a pre-logon screen to the
system, notifying the users that the company retains the right to monitor
all communications for business purposes. Here, the act of the employee
logging-on would most likely manifest implied consent. However,
because of the capricious nature of the limited case law,0 8 the legality
of this policy would hinge largely on the clarity and significance of the
notice given.
3.

Unequal Treatment

In today's workplace, companies with different needs will employ
different e-mail systems. Some employers will subscribe to commercial
services, others may provide their own gateway onto the Internet and still
larger companies may have their own internal, company-owned
systems.' 0 9 Unfortunately, in each situation, the ECPA's spotty
protection becomes even more convoluted. It seems that where the

101. Id.
102. See Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 116 (1st Cir. 1990).
103. Id.
104. See Deal v. Spears 980 F.2d 1153, 1157 (8th Cir. 1992). But see Watkins v. L.M. Berry
& Co., 704 F.2d 577 (11th Cir. 1983) (construing the consent exception).
105. Griggs, 904 F.2d at 117.
106. See Watkins, 704 F.2d at 581.
107. See Deal, 980 F.2d at 1157.
108. See discussion supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
109. See discussion supra Part I.B.
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subscribes to a public service, the law is in its most lucid
employer
10
form.
In the environment of a company-owned, internal e-mail system, the
ECPA's protection is at its weakest. There are proprietary rights of the
employer, derived from the fact that they own the system."' Another
potential argument is that with internal e-mail systems, the communications do not pass throughout a system that affects interstate or foreign
3
commerce,"' thereby making the federal statute inapplicable." Despite evidence that Congress did intend for the ECPA to apply to private
corporate systems," 4 the prevalent view among lawyers is that with
internal systems, employees do not have privacy rights in their e-mail
communications."' Finally, it is unclearl 6whether the "business use
exception" will apply to a private system."
As stated earlier, many systems will automatically create back-up
files of all computer data." 7 It is common knowledge that there are
legitimate reasons for doing so; computer viruses, lost files, and overall
maintenance of the system. However, with an internal system, the backup files now become the property of the company.118 Since the infor9
mation is "stored," access to it is not considered an interception,"
the acquisition is not "contemporaneous with its transmisbecause
120
sion."
However, Title II of the ECPA was drafted to account for this
situation. Chapter 121 of the ECPA is entitled "Store Wire and Electronic

110. See Who Owns Your E-Mail Message?, 10 LAN TIMES, Nov. 15, 1993.
111. See generally Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d 457 (holding that stored e-mail, the fruits of
an internal system, were given less protection then contemporaneously sent messages).
112. See Donald H. Seifman & Craig W. Trepanier, Evolution of the Paperless Office: Legal
Issues Arising Out of Technology in the Workplace, 21 EMPLOYEE REL. U. 3, 10 (1995).
113. The ECPA only regulates communications that effect interstate or foreign commerce. 18

U.S.C. § 2510(12) (1994).
114. See Laurie T. Lee, Watch Your E-Mail! Employee E-Mail Monitoringand Privacy Law in
the Age of the 'Electronic Sweatshop,' 28 J. MARSHALL L. Rv. 139, 152 (1994) (noting that
Congress did intend for ECPA to include intra-company networks, but only expressly to wire

communications).
115. See Eric S. Freidburn, Get the Message? WorkersDon't Own TheirE-Mail,CRAINS SMALL
BUS. Cn., Sept. 5, 1994, at 33.

116. See Donald H. Seifman & Craig W. Trepanier, Evolution of the Paperless Ojfice: Legal
Issues Arising Out of Technology in the Workplace, 21 EMPLOYEE REL. L. 3, 14 (1995).
117. See Tim Cahoon, PlayingPeek-a-boo With E-Mail; Workplace Privacy Issues, HP PROF.

Mar. 1994, at 57.
118. See Bourke v. Nissan Motor Corp., 2 Civil B068705 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the
company had a right to anything on the e-mail system because it was owned by the employer).
119. Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 460.
120. Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol14/iss1/8

14

Araneo: Pandora's (E-Mail) Box: E-Mail Monitoring in the Workplace
1996]

E-Mail Monitoring

Communications and Transactional Records Access."'' Here, "access
without authorization" to the stored information is prohibited.'" The
ECPA distinguishes the two scenarios by providing separate definitions
for "electronic communications,"'" and e-mail messages that are kept
in "electronic storage."' 24 The term "electronic storage" refers to any
temporary, or intermediate storage12 6of a wire or electronic communication" z including all back-up files.
A thorough analysis of the statutory provisions reveals that "stored"
electronic communications are not protected as vigilantly as contemporaneous electronic communications. 27 First, when comparing stored
"wire' communications from stored "electronic" communications, the
former requires a court order,'28 while the latter is only conditioned
upon a search warrant. 2 9 Second, with contemporaneous electronic
communications, a court order allowing authorization of interception is
confined to certain limitations on how the interception is to be conducted. 3 ' The interception must be "conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to
interception,"'' and "must terminate upon attainment of the authorized
objective."'3 2 There are no such requirements for acquiring stored
electronic communications through a search warrant. Finally, intercepting
electronic communications are acutely restricted in duration by providing
that an interception may not be conducted "for any period longer than
necessary... nor in any event, longer than thirty days."' 33 Again, there
are no such restrictions for accessing stored communications.
This distinction between electronic communications and those that
are stored is significant in the environment of a company-owned internal
system. This is because the employer is endowed with the ability to

121. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-27111 (1994).
122. Id. § 2701(a)(1).
123. See supra note 85.

124. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (1994).
125. Id. § 2510(17)(a).
126. Id.§ 2510(17)(b). The statutory definition for "electronic storage" reads: (a) any temporary,

intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission
thereof; and (b) any storage of such communication by an electronic communication service for
purposes of backup protection of such communication. Id. § 2510(17).
127. See Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 462.

128. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1994).
129. Id. § 2703.
§ 2518(5).
130. See id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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create backup files of all data transcribed on the system, and use it as
they wish.1 34 The need to "intercept" as per the ECPA's definition is
therefore extinguished. Moreover, the tangible nature of these backup
files is more conducive to the assertion of property rights than are the
transmissions themselves. This grants the company with the right to view
the files on the hard drive and every message passing through the system
that is put on backup.1 35 The end result is that an employer who has no
right to intercept a given communication
may avoid liability by waiting
36
for the system to store it in backup.1
Thus, the ECPA is to be commended for its spirit in attempting to
confront the problems created by new technology. However, it fails in
practical applicability. 37 Since its enactment in 1986, the evolution of
the ECPA has exposed both its unanticipated flaws and the resulting
statutory loopholes. Perhaps the problems lie not in the statute itself, but
in the drafter's ignorance of the need for new legislation. The poignant
words of Thomas Jefferson are illustrative of the problem:
Laws and Institutions must go hand and hand with the progress of the
human mind. As that becomes more enlightened, as new discoveries are
made, new truths discovered and manner and opinions... advance also
to keep pace with the times. We might as well require a man to wear
still the coat which fitted him when a boy.'38
Unfortunately, the essence of the ECPA's remedial efforts is
comprised of cosmetic alterations of a statute originally drafted for phone
lines, not the sophisticated, technological mediums of the future. Rather
than trying to adapt or reclothe the weathered original, it is imperative
that new legislation be drafted from scratch to adequately and squarely
confront the unique dilemmas of the modem era.
Furthermore, the sporadic composition of case law tackles only a
few of the problems presented, and serves only as the beginning of

134. See Abdon M. Pallasch, Company Policies to Monitor E-Mail Licking Edge of Electronic
Envelope, CHI. LAW., Aug. 1995, at 7.
135. See Cahoon, supra note 117, at 56.
136. See Donald H. Seifman & Craig W. Trepanier, Evolution of the Paperless Office: Legal
Issues Arising Out of Technology in the Workplace, 21 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 3, 14, 17 (1995).
137. See Lois R. Witt, Terminally Nosy: Are Employers Free to Access OurElectronicMail?,
96 DicK. L. REv. 545, 548-53 (1992) (discussing the exemptions and unequal treatment of the
ECPA).
138. Inscription on the Jefferson Memorial. See Ilene Knable Gotts & Alan D. Rutenberg,
Navigatingthe GlobalInformationSuperhighway: A Bumpy Road LiesAhead, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH.

275 (1995).
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foundational precedent that the courts will ultimately build upon.139
Until there is a more complete body of cogent precedent, the case law
remains convoluted and insufficient. 4 Thus, the current state of the
law is in a state of flux. As it stands, employers will continue to have the
141
right to monitor and read their employees' e-mail in most situations.
In order to reach the gravamen of the problem, it is imperative to
step back from the legal sphere of existing laws, new amendments and
court interpretations, and look to where the problems lie; the workplace.
It is only in this context that the real problems will emerge, and a
legitimate remedial strategy can be created.
The first step is to realize that there is a conceptual dichotomy
between the expectations of the employer and that of the employee. One
author describes the two opposing spheres of thought as the "casualness
of speech" versus the "permanence of writing."'4 2 An employer who
either pays for access to a public service or pays for the entire system
has a justified perception of the system's utility; that being a business
tool used for business purposes. Moreover, today's employer is fully
cognizant of the virtual window e-mail can create to the inner workings
of her company. Many ephemeral comments usually made within the
halls, bathrooms or even in discrete private meetings may be sent
through the system by an employee. Since these comments can mature
into hard copy documents, there is the risk of them being used against
the company, or losing them to discovery in litigation."
However, from the employee's perspective, the e-mail system is a
convenient way to communicate from one computer to another, or to
many others. Common in e-mail transmissions are the spelling errors and
typos which are so universally forbidden on the more perennial written
memo. Also a typical occurrence is the latest O.J. Simpson joke sent
through the e-mail system. These are just two indicators of what the
average employee perceives the system to be; a casual, convenient and
transient way to communicate with other employees.
Also extremely inviting, but equally inaccurate, are the begging
analogies to the telephone and the United States Postal Mail. The use of

139. See James J. Cappel, Closing the E-Mail Privacy Gap, 44 J. SYS. MGMT. 6, 11 (1993)
(discussing the lack of precedent that states whether e-mail monitoring is legal).

140. See id.
141. See, e.g., Cappel, supra note 139; see also Eric S.Freidbum, Get the Message? Workers
Don't Own Their E-Mail,CRAiNs SMALL Bus. CHi., Sept. 5, 1994, at 33.
142. See Paul Frisman, E-Mail: Dial 'E'for 'Evidence,' CONN. L. TRiB., Dec. 18, 1995, at 1
(praising e-mail as a seductive, high tech and magical means of communication).

143. Seeki.
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the work phone for personal matters is a necessity for anyone working
a full-time job, and thus, accepted by the employers. It is reasonable to
expect privacy for these matters over the phone, so why should this
theory change just because the e-mail system is used instead of the phone
system? Furthermore, since e-mail is a form of "mail," there is an
inherent connotation of the strict privacy safeguards in the postal
mail.'" The fact that there are user passwords on the typical system 45 only reinforces this presumption. Finally, when the employee
deletes the message, he or she has every right to believe it is in fact
deleted. 46 But as discussed earlier, there is always some type of
backup being stored, and it seems that this backup is almost impossible
to hide from expert computer hackers. 4 7
It is important to note that neither perception is unfeasible. Both the
employer and the employee have tenable arguments and legitimate
concerns. After the recognition of this "conceptual dichotomy," it
becomes clear that both parties are in the dark as to the natural
perceptions of their counterpart. Moreover, the natural tendency to
parallel e-mail to either the postal mail or to telephone communications
only exacerbates the distance between the two opposing perceptions. Email has its own identity and character, and ultimately it brings to the
table new problems of employee privacy and employer monitoring. Once
this concept is fully digested, only then can appropriate legislation be
drafted.
IX. PROPOSAL

A.

Require Employers to Develop and Publish an E-Mail Policy

In amending the federal wiretap statute, the ECPA merely rephrased
and altered the statutory language. Unfortunately, this was not the ideal
means to the desired end of finding the appropriate balance between
employee privacy rights to their e-mail'48 and the employer's reciprocal

144. See Brian D. Pedrow & Debra E. Kohn, Tampering With E-Mail: ProprietaryRights and
PrivacyIssues, L. PRAc. MGMT., Nov./Dec., 1995, at 36, 37.
145. See Cappel, supra note 139, at 12.
146. See Pedrow & Kohn, supra note 144, at 36-37.
147. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
148. See generally Witt, supra note 137.
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rights to monitor the e-mail system. 4 9 The purpose of this writing
however, is not to achieve this equilibrium nor even to suggest its
existence, but rather to urge a simple solution to the problem at hand.
Until the law can catch up with technology, the employer should be
required to provide clear and detailed policies for how the e-mail system
is to be regulated in the workplace. The employer who embraces this
philosophy clearly retains control over how their system is governed, yet
is practicing defensive management against the unreliable state of the
law. The incorporation of such a policy would clearly delineate the rights
retained by the employer and those granted to the employees. The effect
then, would penetrate the core of the "conceptual dichotomy," because
it pins down all the wandering perceptions of both parties and converts
them into rights and wrongs.
Enacting an e-mail policy detailing how the system will be
maintained and regulated will be beneficial to the employer and at the
same time allow them to remain autonomous in choosing how to run
their own environment. For example, many companies today such as
Federal Express, Du Pont and United Parcel Service outwardly proclaim
their rights over their employees' e-mail. 5 ' Other companies like
General Motors, McDonnell Douglas and Citibank have adopted a "hands
off" philosophy 5 ' that is based on "mutual trust and respect."' 52
Therefore, a requirement to enact an e-mail policy preserves the
employer's independence to choose the philosophy that is most suitable
to its corporate culture. What a policy will do is provide notice to the
employees of exactly what rights are granted to them and those that
remain vested in the employer. This in turn, clearly informs the
employees as to what type of environment they are in, and how to act
accordingly. In fact, studies show that employees will be more amenable
to an announced monitoring policy than to being kept in the dark, even
policy reserves the highest degree of employer
if the announced
t 3
monitoring.

149. See Robert Barker, E-Mail Issues, INTERNAL AuDITOR, Aug. 1995, at 62 (suggesting there
is little in the way of statutory or case law that would allow the employer to determine what is
allowed or what can be done to protect the company from exposure to liability if it decides to
monitor it's employees e-mail).
150. See Cappel, supra note 139, at 6-7.
151. John K Keitt, Jr., & Cynthia L. Kahn, Special Report; The Law of Intellectual Properties;
Changes and Complexities, LEGAL TIMES, May 2,1994, at 24, 28.
152. Id.
153. See Cappel, supra note 139, at 9.
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The realities in today's workplace illustrate further the need to
require employers to devise an e-mail policy. One survey indicates that
22 percent of the responding companies reviewed their employees' 1e55
mail," and 60 percent of these companies concealed this fact.
Thus, most companies that admit to e-mail monitoring are keeping their
employees in the dark. Other data have indicated that less than 10
percent of United States companies have e-mail policies. 5 6 Finally,
another report has indicated that 76 percent of the companies studied
if an e-mail policy existed at all within their environwere unaware
57
ment.
It follows then, that there is a noticeable amount of ignorance in the
workplace as to the need for e-mail guidelines and monitoring policies,
and currently employers have yet to take a proactive stance.'5 8 The
increasing likelihood that e-mail will be subject to and pursued for
discovery purposes159 also extends the need for employers to enact a
clear policy, from a defensive point of view. If employers make clear the
sensitive and unprotected nature of e-mail to their employees, this may
prevent the inadvertent disclosure of vital information, in the event of
litigation." ° While a similar notification made to employees during the
course of a pending lawsuit or investigation may tend to inculpate the
time will be viewed as a
company, implementing this policy ahead of
61
prudent preventative management practice.'
Ideally, new legislation is needed to successfully remedy the
problems with employer e-mail monitoring. Encouraging employers to
develop e-mail policies and publish them to their employees however, is
a simple interim solution to theproblem of e-mail monitoring. It avoids
the more intricate and complicated arguments of to what degree the

154. See Abdon M. Pallasch, Company Policies to Monitor E-Mail Licking Edge ofElectronic
Envelope, CHI. LAW., Aug. 1995, at 4.
155. See Jeffery A. Van Doren, E-mail Policies are a Must, AM. LAW., Dec. 1995, at 14.
156. See Bonwyn Fryer and Roberta Furger, Who's Reading Your E-Mail?, PC WORLD, Aug.
1993, at 166, 168-69.
157. See Tim Cahoon, PlayingPeek-a-boo With E-Mail; Workplace PrivacyIssues, HP PROF.,
Mar. 1994, at 59.
158. But cf Margaret C. Phillips, The Challengeof Defining 'Acceptable Use,.' LEGAL TIMES,
Jan. 22, 1996, at S38 (suggesting that some employers have enacted policies on their e-mail
monitoring practices, although most are already obsolete).
159. See Paul Frisman, E-Mail: Dial 'E'for'Evidence, CONN. L. TRIB., Dec. 18, 1995, at 1;
see also supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
160. See Donald H. Seifman & Craig W. Trepanier, Evolution of the Paperless Office: Legal
Issues Arising out of Technology in the Workplace, 21 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 3, 27-28 (1995).
161. See id; see also Robert Barker, E-Mail Issues, INTERNAL AuDITOR, Aug. 1995, at 62
(asserting simple e-mail regulations and policies will help limit the potential for legal issues to arise).
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employer can, in fact, monitor the e-mail system, 62 and the right to
employee monitoring in general, 63 as they are issues that require new
legislative efforts.
It is important to note the implicit concession made by the courts to
the employer in holding that they should have the choice to reasonably
monitor the system.'6 In return for this concession then, the employer
should be required to exercise their advantageous role responsibly. The
creation, implementation and dissemination of the type of e-mail
monitoring5 practice chosen by the employer is the ideal avenue to reach
16
this goal.
The premise of enacting an e-mail policy is not necessarily an infant
theory. Many articles have discussed their legitimacy,' 66 and even
suggested its adoption. 67 In fact, there is even a toolkit available to
assist employers in developing e-mail policies.168 One author even
asserts that there are already a lineage of e-mail policies in many
companies across the country, and that they are already obsolete. 69
However, the reality is that most companies have yet to collectively
adopt these policies, and empirical data supports the notion that
companies are completely ignorant of what an e-mail policy is and what
it can do. 7 °
As discussed earlier, the current state of the law puts the employer
in such an advantageous position,' he or she may not see the need to
spend the time or the energy to create and implement an e-mail policy.
However, this perception will only backfire on the employer because
without a policy, she stands on weaker footing in the face of sexual

162. See Thomas R. Greenberg, E-Mail and Voice Mail: Employee Privacy and the Federal
Wiretap Statute, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 219, 239-41 (1994).
163. See Larry 0. Natt Gantt II, An Affront to Human Dignity. ElectronicMail Monitoring in
the PrivateSector Workplace, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 345 (1995).
164. See, e.g., Frisman, supra note 159, at 5 (conceding that employers do have the right to
monitor e-mail systems under the current state of the law).
165. See Jeanne W. Harvey, Set Your Rules on E-Mail, NATIONS Bus., Aug. 1995, at 48-49;
Abdon M. Pallasoh, Company Policiesto Monitor E-MailLicking Edge ofElectronicEnvelope, CI.
LAW., Aug. 1995, at 4.
166. See Van Doren, supra note 155 at 14.
167. See Teresa A. Daniel, Electronic and Voice Mail Monitoring of Employees: A Practical
Approach, 22 EMPLOYMENT REL. TODAY 1 (1995); see also Harvey, supra note 165, at 49.
168. The Electronic Mail Association in Arlington, VA provides this toolkit. See James J.
Cappel, Closing the E-Mail Privacy Gap, 44 J. SYs. MGMT. 6, 9-10 (1993).
169. See Phillips, supra note 158, at S39.
170. See discussion supra Part II.A.
171. See discussion supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
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harassment claims," discovery requests for litigation173 and the risk
of losing privileged or confidential information."
The best way to initiate a trend or clear a path for the adoption of
e-mail policies is to require the employer to enact them by statute. Until
a more appropriate body of legislation is enacted, employers who benefit
from using e-mail should be required to implement a basic e-mail policy.
The essence of the policy will be to provide notice of how the system
will be maintained and monitored. The ideal policy, discussed below,
should also inform the employees of the sensitive nature of e-mail
communications. A statutory, administrative or regulatory requirement
will not hinder the employer because it poses no restrictions on them
besides that of documentation of the policy. The employer still retains its
autonomy to decide how to regulate its system. The instability of the
current state of the law and the rapid proliferation of e-mail in the
workplace are fusing together to create a certain clash between the
opposing perceptions of the employer and the employee. It is predicted
that the problems will soon penetrate the courtrooms to develop into the
next litigation nightmare.17 This can be rectified at an early stage if
the employer is forced to take a proactive stance in developing an e-mail
policy.
B. Pending Legislation
The idea of requiring employers to develop e-mail policies by
statute has in fact been previously attempted. The Privacy for Consumers
and Workers Act 176 ("PCWA"), was such an attempt. The PCWA has
many supporters, its primary sponsor being Senator Paul Simon (D177
HI).
The House sponsor is Pat Williams (D-Mont.), and the Americorporate American Civil Liberties Union. 7 1 In addition, members of
179
revisions.
and
drafting
bill's
the
in
assisted
have
ca

172. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
175. See Cappel, supra note 168, at 7 (commenting that e-mail privacy has emerged as one of
the stickiest legal issues of our time).
176. H.R. 1900, 103d Cong. (1993); S.984, 103d Cong. (1993).
177. See Lauren Coleman-Lochner, Candid Camera:Many Companies Spy on Their Workers,
BERGEN REc., Jan. 9, 1995, at C4.

178. Lewis Maltby, Director of the ACLU's Workplace Division has helped draft and revise the
bill. See Coleman-Lochner, supra note 177, at C4.
179. See Coleman-Lochner, supranote 177, at C3. One member of corporate America is Micheal
Tamer, the owner of Teknkron, a manufacturer of surveillance equipment. His presence was an effort
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The bill was created as a response to the current anomaly of the
ECPA's aftermath. For example, under the ECPA, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation is required by law to obtain a court order to wiretap a
conversation, even in cases of national security, yet private employers are
permitted to spy at will on their employees and the public. 180 Both the
House version' and the Senate version"8 have been introduced to
their respective legislative bodies in the 102nd and 103rd congressional
sessions. 8 3 However, to date, neither version has been passed."8
There has been some political resistance to the PCWA that is
preventing it from being passed. One of the drafters has blatantly
commented that it's prospects are bleak, presumably because of the
Republican sweep in Congress.' Other authors find flaw in the bill
due to the fact that the two versions are incompatible and that it provides
inconsistent protection to employees based on seniority.'86
The bill, in general, relates to electronic monitoring and surveillance,
only one method of which is e-mail. Its core provision is that "people
have a right to know when they're being watched."187 If passed, the
PCWA would regulate any individual or business entity employing any
number of workers' and require these employers to tell their new
employees when and how they would be monitored. 9 The Senate's
version requires that the day and hour of the monitoring be given, 90
but the latest revision of the House bill does not.' 9 ' The total time an
employee could be monitored would be capped at two hours per week
as per the Senate version, 92 although the House bill does not limit this
at all for the first sixty days of employment. 9 3 Finally, the random

to make the bill more palatable to the business community. See Coleman-Lochner, supra note 177,

at C3.
180. 139 CONG. REc. SOOO, (1993) (statement of Sen. Paul Simon).
181. H.R. 1900.
182. S. 984.
183. See Julie A. Flanagan, Restricting Electronic Monitoring in the Private Workplace, 43
DUKE L.J 1256, 1271, n.108 (1994).
184. The bill had yet to be reintroduced in the 104th Congress by September 1, 1996.
185. See Coleman-Lochner, supra note 177, at C3.
186. See Natt-Gantt, supra note 163, at 409.
187. See Coleman-Lochner, supra note 177, at Cl.
188. H.R. 1900 §§ 2, 3.

189. S. 984 § 4(b).
190. See id.
191. See Section by Section Analysis ofthe PrivacyforConsumersand Workers Act (H.R. 1900),

Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) D-32 (Feb. 24, 1994).
192. S. 984 § 5(3)(2).

193. H.R. 1900 §5.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1996

23

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 8
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 14:339

monitoring of employees who have over five years at the company would
be prohibited in the Senate version, 94 but is permitted to continue
under the House version. 95 The bill does not, however require notice
to the employees of monitoring if the employer suspects the employee
is engaged in unlawful activity, or misconduct that would have an
adverse effect on the employer.196
The PCWA, as discussed, has met with political obstinence for
various reasons. One of those reasons was that the bill contained too
many vague terms. 97 The implication of this is that perhaps, if the bill
were stripped down to a leaner, more focused proposition, it would be
more palatable to the legislature. Although this is an ambitious conclusion stemming from only one of several reasons for its rejection, it is not
untenable. Furthermore, since the main premise of this note (providing
notice to the employees of the employer's monitoring practices via an email policy) was only one of the requirements of the PCWA, it is logical
that a more acute bill embodying only this premise may indeed have a
better chance of being passed. The PCWA has in effect, carved a path
through the legislative channels for a new statutory, administrative or
regulatory endeavor to require employers to create and implement e-mail
policies.
C. A Model Policy
Creating, implementing and maintaining the ideal e-mail monitoring
policy can be done with minimal effort. There are some fundamental
considerations, which are listed here. They are however, by no means
exhaustive. Undoubtedly, and somewhat ironically, there is a plethora of
such suggestions to be found on the Internet. Employers are encouraged
to keep the following ideas in mind when devising their own policies.
(1) First and foremost, the employer needs to inform the employees
of the type of e-mail monitoring it chooses to adopt. This is vital to set
the tone of the working environment and set the employees expectations
of using the system.
(2) Employers should also discuss the sensitive nature of e-mail. The
begging analogies to both the postal mail and telephone calls should be

194. S. 984, §5(B)(3).
195. H.R. 1900, §5.
196. S. 984, §5(C)(1).
197. See discussion supra note 184 and accompanying text.
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clearly discredited, informing them the latter two forms have certain
privacy safeguards, while e-mail does not.
(3) Employees should be reminded of the potential use of e-mail in
litigation whenever they use the system.
(4) Employers should warn employees that technology is always
building a better mousetrap and their messages are never completely safe
from third party access.
(5) A document retention time frame 19 8 should be implemented.
This keeps the employee aware of the fact that backup is kept only for
a limited amount of time. The benefit to the employer is that with less
backup available, there will be less risk of liability. This also encourages
the employees to be more efficient in the sense that they need to be
aware of what files they actually have, instead of falling into more
laxadasical habits of relying on backup.
(6) Employers may also want to provide passwords or encryption
facilities to protect individual files, and mandate that no employees can
enter the files of another without consent. Note, however, that taking this
step may create an implicit expectation of privacy. The employer should
disarm this expectation by reminding the employees that although these
safeguards are implemented, there is no zone of guaranteed privacy.
(7) E-mail messages of a harassing, intimidating, offensive or
discriminating nature should be strictly prohibited, and be designated as
grounds for dismissal.
(8) Regardless of whether the employer enacts a restrictive or
permissive monitoring practice, she should require that e-mail is to be
used for business purposes only. This will activate the "business use
exception,"'9 9 and allow the employer to investigate legitimate business
concerns.
(9) To implement the policy, employers should have a policy
submitted to the entire staff, new hires, and periodically redistribute it.
Each copy should have an assigned release form, to be signed by the
employee, signifying that they have read and understand the policy.
Access to the system should be frozen until the form has been returned.
(10) Finally, an efficient method to ensure notice has been provided
is to install a pre-logon screen into the system saying that there is an
existing e-mail policy each user should be aware of. Ifthe screen informs

198. See, e.g., John K. Keitt, Jr., & Cynthia L. Kahn, Special Report; The Law ofIntellectual
Properties;Changes and Complexities, LEGAL TIMES, May 2, 1994, at 25.
199. See discussion supra Part I.D.2.
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the user that the employer reserves the right to monitor the system, the
logging on may later be construed as a manifestation of implied consent.
I.

CONCLUSION

In closing, the problem of e-mail monitoring in the workplace
inevitably brings the needs of the employer into a head-on collision with
the privacy rights of their employees. As discussed, both parties have
legitimate concerns underlying their respective positions. Unfortunately
the law, in its current state, offers no clear cut rules to work with. The
controlling federal statute is clearly inadequate in addressing the
problems that are occurring in the workplace today. The case law is just
beginning to surface and thus is not a strong body of legal precedent.
Therefore the law is in a state of flux with regard to employee email monitoring by employers. Employers have taken advantage of this
legal vacuum by monitoring their employee's e-mail and justifying their
actions through assertions of the e-mail being employer property or by
coercing consent by employee's using the e-mail system. There has been
at least one legislative endeavor to address this problem, which remains
an unpassed bill, largely for political reasons. Unfortunately, the problem
endures, and some action must be taken. This Note urges employers to
create, adopt and announce an e-mail monitoring policy. Until the law
can catch up with technology and address this problem, such policies will
bring a needed balance to the positions of both parties.
John Araneo
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